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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Guy L. Coulston appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by a 
jury for lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Coulston with lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen for 
having genital-to-genital and/or manual-to-genital contact with A.M. when she was 
between the ages of ten and fifteen. (R., pp.74-75.) The following summary of the facts 
underlying Coulston's conviction are gleaned from the testimony and evidence 
presented during his jury trial. 
When A.M. was about nine or ten years old, 1 her mother, who was married to 
Coulston at the time, dropped out of A.M.'s life, resulting in A.M. filling the "mother role" 
for Coulston and his two younger daughters (A.M.'s half-sisters) while she continued to 
live in his home; the "role" included cooking, cleaning, laundry, and getting Coulston's 
daughters ready for school.2 (Tr., p.307, Ls.12-20; p.311, L.14 - p.312, L.4. 3) Coulston 
and A.M.'s mother divorced when A.M. was about ten or eleven years old. (Tr., p.308, 
Ls.18-24.) 
1 A.M. was sixteen years old when she testified at trial. (Tr., p.304, Ls.18-19.) 
2 A.M.'s mother and Coulston had two younger daughters together, and A.M. had not 
had a relationship with her biological father since she was four or five years old. (Tr., 
p.307, Ls.3-11; p.309, Ls.7-12.) 
3 Apart from the trial transcript, the only transcripts that are part of the appellate record 
relate to the jury's return of the verdict and Coulston's Rule 35 motion. Inasmuch as 
there are no appellate issues concerning those matters, the trial transcript will be cited 
simply as "Tr." 
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AM. testified that for about five years, beginning "around two weeks before 
[AM.'s] 11 th birthday," Coulston engaged in sexual intercourse with her "between two to 
four times" a week, and "sometimes it would happen every night, and then every once 
in a while it would happen ... once a week," usually in his bedroom. (Tr., p.317, Ls.1-
16; p.320, Ls.2-23; p.330, Ls.7-10.) Coulston would let AM. know he wanted to have 
sexual intercourse with her by telling her that he wanted "love-ins." (Tr., p.321, Ls.23-
25.) Coulston supplied AM. with lubricants and lotions for her to use, but he never 
used· a condom even though he typically ejaculated inside her during sexual 
intercourse. (Tr., p.323, L.15 - p.324, L.24.) When other people lived or stayed in the 
house, Coulston would have sexual intercourse with AM. in his bedroom, but "[h]e 
would tell people that [they] were spending time, like father/daughter time" together. 
(Tr., p.328, L.22 - p.329, L.21.) AM. slept in Coulston's bedroom instead of her own 
bedroom "[e]very night unless another person was there" because he "would get really 
mad and angry and just mean if [she] didn't." (Tr., p.321, Ls.3-9.) AM. took showers in 
the bathroom of Coulston's master bedroom and kept much of her "stuff'' in his 
bathroom -- cosmetics, toothbrush, razor, lotion, shampoo, conditioner, and other 
personal care products. (Tr., p.321, Ls.10-18; p.337, L.21 - p.340, L.5.) 
AM. testified that the last time Coulston had sexual intercourse with her was on 
November 27, 2011, two days before she told a school counselor about the abuse. (Tr., 
p.314, Ls.12-18.) She explained that she was in Coulston's bed and he removed her 
clothing and engaged in sexual intercourse until he ejaculated inside her. (Tr., p.316, 
L.5 - p.318, L.17.) After putting on her clothes, AM. noticed her underwear "had the 
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semen in it, and it was gross," so she went to her bedroom and "changed out of those 
and left them in [her] room and put another pair on." (Tr., p.318, Ls.8-23.) 
On November 29, 2011,4 AM. (fifteen years old at the time) reported to a high 
school counselor that Coulston had had sexual intercourse with her. (Tr., p.312, L.5 -
p.314, L.18.) Deputy Sheriff Dennis Stinebaugh went to the school and interviewed 
AM. with the counselor present. (Tr., p.206, L.15 - p.207, L.18; p.313, Ls.8-19.) After 
the interview, Deputy Stinebaugh drove AM. to the detective's division of the Sheriff's 
Department, where Detective Darrell Oyler interviewed her and prepared her to make a 
"pretext" phone call to Coulston. (Tr., p.207, L.21 - p.208, L.1; p.215, L. 20 - p.217, L.5; 
p.313, L.20 - p.314, L.5.) 
The recording of the pretext call, State's Exhibit 5, was admitted and published to 
the jury. (Tr., p.219, L.21 - p. 221, L.4.) During the first part of that conversation, 
Coulston said he had been told that Sheriffs officers had picked up AM.'s sisters and he 
wanted to know if AM. had also been picked up or knew where her sisters were. (St. 
Ex. 5, 00:00-01 :00.) AM. denied knowing where her sisters were, and after she told 
Coulston she was still at school he ordered her to stay there and told her he would have 
someone pick her up while he tried to find out where the younger sisters were. (Id.) 
AM. told Coulston that she did not want to go home because she was "sick" of 
the way he was treating her and her sisters, and she had just talked to a school 
counselor and told her about the physical abuse and beatings. (St. Ex. 5, 01 :00-01 :40.) 
AM. informed Coulston that she "almost told her about our love-ins too." (St. Ex. 5, 
4 Although the prosecutor asked AM. if she talked with her school counselor on 
November 27, 2011 (Tr., p.312, Ls.5-8) -- which was a Sunday -- other testimony 
correctly establishes that AM. met with her counselor on November 29, 2011 (see Tr., 
p.206, L.15 - p.207, L.13). 
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01 :40-01 :50.) Coulston responded, 'Well then, you know what [A.M.], then [unclear] 
you can go with [unclear] him then ... because all I was trying to do was make your 
guys' life better." (St. Ex. 5, 01 :50-02:00.) A.M. replied, "But Dad, you're 31 and I'm 
15." (St. Ex. 5, 02:00-02:05.) A.M. and Coulston argued about whether Coulston had 
almost beaten her when she tried to talk to him about the subject, and he said, "Well, I 
guess I'll just go to the Sheriff's Office then," and asked A.M. where she wanted to go. 





















Should I tell somebody though? 
No! I told you to talk to me about this before [A.M.]. 
I did -- I tried to. 
No you have not. 
I did. 
No you did not. Uh ... tell me what you want to do. So, 
I'm just going to the Sheriff's Office and wait to see what 
happens. 
Well, I want ... Dad, I want the sex to stop. 
Okay, fine [A.M.]. 
Okay .... 
Hello? 
Hi, are you sorry? 
What? 
Are you sorry? 
Yes, I'm very sorry [A.M.]. I never wanted to hurt you. 
I tried telling you I didn't want to .... 
Uh -- okay, what do you want, what do you want ... what 
do I do? 
I don't know. 
Where do you want to go? 
I don't know ... I was scared that I'd get pregnant Dad. 
[A.M.] what do you ... okay. I'm not gonna take this on. 
told you to talk to me and you know what, obviously 
something is going on in your life that you're not talking to 
me about and I'm not gonna do this. . . . I'm not ... I'm 
sorry if I've ever hurt you girls or anything else and I'm not 







Parents don't have sex with their kids. 
What? 
Parents don't have sex with their kids. 
[A.M.], you know what? I'm just going to go to the Sheriff's 
Office because I want to find out who the fuck has been 
talking to you and what the fuck has been going on. 
(St. Ex. 5, 02:50-07:05.) 
About an hour later, Detective Oyler called Coulston and asked him come to the 
Sheriff's Department and talk with him. (Tr., p.222, Ls.9-17.) Coulston went to the 
Sheriff's Department, and after Detective Oyler advised him of his Miranda rights, 
Coulston stated that he understood his rights and agreed to be interviewed. (Tr., p.16, 
L.3 - p.17, L.5; St. Ex. 6, 04:50-6:30.) Almost half way through the interview, and before 
Coulston had admitted to having had sexual intercourse with A.M., he was confronted 
with several statements he made in response to A.M.'s allegations during the pretext 
phone call, as well as his failure to deny those allegations. (St. Ex. 6, 24:15-28:15.) The 





So this is where we're at with it. 
No, I'm not ... no. 
Guess from here on out, cause I know you guys got your 
things and better talk to an attorney. I have no idea. 
(St. Ex. 6, 28:15-28:35.) 
A few minutes later, after being informed that A.M. was having a sexual abuse 
examination at the hospital, Coulston agreed to "play ball" with Detective Oyler and 
admitted that, about two years prior, he woke up from his sleep to find A.M. riding on top 
of him with his penis outside his underwear. (St. Ex. 6, 41 :00-43: 15.) Coulston 
explained that, after that incident, he felt threatened by A.M. and had no real choice but 
to have sex with her. (St. Ex. 6, 43:16-44:05.) When Detective Oyler asked Coulston 
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whether he had sexual intercourse with A.M. a couple times a month, Coulston 
answered, "if." (St. Ex. 6, 4410-44:35.) Coulston said he did not use protection during 
sexual intercourse with A.M. and that he would ejaculate inside her. (St. Ex. 6, 44:36-
44:55.) Coulston further explained that A.M. "had brought it on to [him]." (St. Ex. 6, 
44:56-45:06.) At the end of the interview, Detective Oyler took two oral swabs from 
each of Coulston's cheeks to obtain a sample of Coulston's DNA and placed him under 
arrest for lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. (Tr., St. Ex. 6, 55:00-1 :01 :45.) 
Earlier that same day, Detective Oyler had arranged for A.M. to go to "KMC" 
(Kootenai Medical Center), where she was examined by Nikki Peters, a sexual assault 
nurse examiner. (Tr., p.222, Ls.1-4; p.425, L.9- p.426, L.16.) Ms. Peters took swabs of 
A.M.'s inner thigh, back, mouth, and vagina, and placed them into containers inside a 
sexual assault kit before releasing it to a police officer. (Tr., p.434, L.15 - p.435, L.24; 
p.442, L.12 - p.443, L.15.) On November 30, 2011, Detective Oyler obtained and 
executed a search warrant for Coulston's residence, and during that search officers 
found and photographed many women's items and products that were in the bathroom 
of Coulston's master bedroom. (Tr., p.226, Ls.3-24; p.260, L.23 - p.261, L.14; St. Exs. 
38-42.) Inside A.M.'s bedroom, Detective Oyler located two pair of panties, seized 
them, and placed them into evidence with a request that they be sent to the State lab. 
(Tr., p.262, L.5 - p.264, L.2; St. Exs. 49-52.) 
Rylene Nowlin, a Forensic Scientist with the Idaho State Police ("I.S.P.") 
Forensic Services, tested the swabs from the sexual assault kit and "did find sperm 
present on the vaginal swabs ... and a limited number of sperm present on a swab 
labeled 'back and inner thighs."' (Tr., p.384, L.22 - p.385, L.3; p.390, L.2 - p.392, L.12.) 
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She also determined that "[s]perm was present on both pair of panties." (Tr., p.396, 
L.25 - p.397, L.18.) 
Upon further testing for DNA comparison with Coulston's DNA, I.S.P. Forensic 
Scientist Stacy Guess determined that a vaginal swab from AM. had a mixture of AM. 's 
DNA and a contributor's DNA, and that Coulston could not be excluded as the 
contributor because "it was 87 billion times more likely to observe the profile developed 
from this vaginal swab evidence if the DNA came from a mixture of [AM.] and Mr. 
Coulston as opposed to if the mixture had come from [AM.] and an unknown random 
person selected from the population." (Tr., p.408, L.12 - p.409, L.17.) Similarly, the 
semen on one of the pair of panties found in AM.'s bedroom matched the DNA profile 
of Coulston based on the probability of one in fourteen quintillion that, "when a person is 
randomly selected from the population, that they too would have a profile that matches 
the evidence." (Tr., p.410, L.9 - p.412, L.7.) Ms. Guess did not conduct DNA analysis 
of the other swabs or panties that had semen on them because, "if there's not [sic] 
thought to be another person who could have possibly contributed semen," she usually 
analyzes only one sample. (Tr., p.409, L.19 - p.410, L.4; p.412, Ls.20-25.) 
Prior to trial, Coulston filed a motion to suppress all the statements he made 
during his videotaped police interview after he told the Detective Oyler, "Better talk to an 
Attorney. I have no idea."5 (R., pp.83-84.) After a hearing, the district court denied the 
suppression motion. (R., pp.315-316; Tr., p.12, L.5 - p.33, L.6.) At the end of trial, the 
5 The Motion to Suppress alleged, "Defendant told the Detective: " .... from here on out 
.. .. I better talk to an Attorney" thereafter the Detective ignored the invocation and 
continued the interrogation." (R., p.83.) Neither the district court nor Coulston's counsel 
on appeal include the word "I" in their respective renditions of what the videotaped 
interview states. (See Tr., p.31, Ls.21-23; p.32, Ls.20-25; Appellant's Brief, p.9.) 
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jury found Coulston guilty of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. (R., p.286.) The 
district court sentenced Coulston to 35 years with 15 years fixed. (R., pp.298-303.) 
Coulston timely appealed. (R., pp.306-307.) 
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ISSUE 
Coulston states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Coulston's motion to suppress 
statements made during an interrogation where Mr. Coulston's [sic] 
unequivocally requested an attorney? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Coulston failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that he did not 
make an unequivocal request for counsel during his interview with Detective Oyler? 
9 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Denying Coulston's 
Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
On appeal, Coulston claims the district court erred in denying his suppression 
motion, arguing that his statements to Detective Oyler should have been suppressed 
because he made an unequivocal request for an attorney. (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-11.) 
However, a review of the record shows that Coulston did not invoke his right to counsel 
and that Detective Oyler in no way prevented Coulston from doing so. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated." State v. 
Custodio, 136 Idaho 197, 201, 30 P.3d 975, 979 (Ct. App. 2001 ). On appeal, the court 
must "accept the trial court's findings of facts which are supported by substantial 
evidence," but may "freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts 
as found." Id. 
C. Coulston Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That 
Coulston Did Not Invoke His Right To Counsel 
In order to validly invoke Miranda rights, a defendant must be in custody 
equivalent to formal arrest. State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 436, 258 P.3d 950, 956 (Ct. 
App. 2011 ). Mere presence at a police station while talking to police is not the 
equivalent of formal arrest. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1977) 
(suspect not in custody for purposes of Miranda when he voluntarily went to police 
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station, was immediately informed that he was not under arrest, and was allowed to 
leave).6 
"After rights are read to and acknowledged by the detainee," the police may 
initiate and continue questioning the detainee "until the right to silence or counsel is 
asserted." State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 822 P.2d 960 (1991). It is undisputed that 
Detective Oyler read Coulston his rights, and when asked if he understood those rights, 
Coulston stated that he did. (St. Ex. 6, 04:50-6:30.) Accordingly, it was proper for 
Detective Oyler to initiate and continue questioning Coulston unless and until Coulston 
invoked his right to remain silent and/or his right to counsel. 
To be effective, a defendant's invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel 
must be clear and unequivocal. The United States Supreme Court, in Davis v. United 
States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), held: 
[l]f a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or 
equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would 
have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to 
counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning. 
Rather, the suspect must unambiguously request counsel . . . . [A 
suspect] must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently 
clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would 
6 The record shows that Coulston voluntarily went to the Sheriff's Department to be 
interviewed. (Tr., p.222, Ls.9-17.) Upon entering the interview room, the detective told 
Coulston he appreciated him "coming down ... in a timely manner." (St. Ex. 6, 04:20-
04:25.) Coulston responded, "My kids are important ... what the heck is going on 
here?" (St. Ex. 6, 04:26-04:30.) After Coulston provided his full name and date of birth, 
the detective told him, "Well, before we go any further I'm gonna read you your rights 
okay. You're not under arrest at this time." (St. Ex. 6, 04:50-05:00.) After being 
advised of his Miranda rights, Coulston acknowledged that he understood his rights and 
agreed to be interviewed. (Tr., p.16, L.3 - p.17, L.5; St. Ex. 6, 05:03-06:30.) However, 
over half way through the interview, and before Coulston made any specific verbal 
admissions, the detective told him, "at this stage, yeah, I'm gonna arrest ya, I'm not 
gonna lie to ya, I'm gonna arrest ya." (St. Ex. 6, 40-40-40:47.) The state does not 
contend that Coulston was not in custody after that point in the interview. 
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understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. If the statement 
fails to meet the requisite level of clarity, Edwards [v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 
477 (1981)], does not require that the officers stop questioning the 
suspect. 
Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (internal citations omitted; Edwards citation added). 
In Davis, the defendant, after ninety minutes of questioning, said, "Maybe I 
should talk to a lawyer." 512 U.S. at 455. The Court held this "was not a request for 
counsel." lg. at 461 (emphasis added). Idaho law is in accord. In State v. Doe, 137 
Idaho 519, 525, 50 P .3d 1014, 1020 (2002), the Idaho Supreme Court held that a 
mother asking whether her son needed a lawyer and advising the detective that she 
could not afford a lawyer was not a clear and unambiguous request for counsel. In 
State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 26 P.3d 31 (2001 ), the Supreme Court held that stating "I 
don't have a lawyer" and asking "am I supposed to have a lawyer?" or "will I get a 
lawyer tomorrow?" does not equate to a clear and unequivocal request for counsel. 
Finally, in State v. Eby, 136 Idaho 534, 37 P.3d 625 (Ct. App. 2001), the court held that 
telling the detective "I've got an attorney" was merely an "oblique reference" to an 
attorney, "not an invocation of the right to counsel that obligated the officers to terminate 
their interrogation." 
At the end of the suppression motion hearing, the district court correctly noted 
the operable law, explaining: 
The law in his area in the state of Idaho, the leading case, I think, is State 
versus Eby, 136 Idaho 534. In that case the defendant during an interview 
made a statement as follows: "I've got an attorney." The court stated the 
law to be as follows: 
"Under Miranda and its progeny, when a person who is 
being subjected to custodial interrogation states that he 
wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an 
12 
attorney is present or the suspect himself reinitiates the 
conversation." 
" ... regardless of whether Eby was 'in custody' for Miranda 
purposes, his oblique reference to his attorney was not an 
invocation of the right to counsel that obligated the officers to 
terminate their interrogation. The Miranda restraint on police 
questioning does not arise unless the request for counsel is 
clear and unambiguous." 
(Tr., p.29, L.11 - p.30, L.6.) The court further noted that the Eby decision embraced 
Davis, 512 U.S. 452, and its statement that: 
"If a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or 
equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would 
have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to 
counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning." 
"Rather, the suspect must unambiguously request counsel. As we 
have observed, 'a statement either is such an assertion of the right to 
counsel or it is not.' Although a suspect need not 'speak with the 
discrimination of an Oxford don,' he must articulate his desire to have 
counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the 
circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an 
attorney. If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of clarity" ... the 
law "does not require that the officers stop questioning the suspect." 
[Quoting Eby, 136 Idaho at 537, 37 P.3d at 682 (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. 
at 458).] 
"Of course, when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal 
statement it will often be good police practice for the interviewing officers 
to clarify whether or not he actually wants an attorney ... " "But we 
decline to adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying questions. If the 
suspect's statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for 
counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him." 
(Tr., p.30, L.12 - p.31, L.17 (quoting Eby, 136 Idaho at 537, 37 P.3d at 628).) 
After reviewing the testimony and evidence, including Coulston's videotaped 
interview by Detective Oyler, presented at the suppression hearing, the district court 
concluded that Coulston's statement was not an unequivocal request for counsel, 
stating: 
13 
Applying that law to the present case, the exact statement by Mr. 
Coulston in the disk was as follows: "Guess from here on out, because I 
know you guys got your things, better talk to an attorney. I have no idea." 
That was the first one. 
Then at the end of the statement at the end of the interview, the 
defendant stated, "Do I still get to speak to an attorney?" The detective 
responded as follows: "Yeah. You can get an attorney anytime you want 
to. No one ever said you couldn't' get an attorney." And then the 
defendant stated: "Well, I know my rights."[7l 
Implying [sic] the law to those statements, it seems to me that those 
are not a -- that neither statement is a clear and unequivocal request to 
have an attorney. I think the statement is ambiguous and is equivocal. 
The -- the issue came up in -- it's a Texas case .... That is Davis 
versus State, 313 Southwest 3rd 317, which is a Texas appellate court 
decision of 2010. In that case the -- during the interview the defendant 
stated, "I should have an attorney." The Court there went through a very 
extensive analysis of the law in this area and came to the conclusion that 
this was not an unambiguous request and was not sufficient to halt the 
interview. The statement that was made in that request that was made in 
that Davis case, "I should have an attorney," and the one part of the 
statement here where Mr. Coulston says, "Better talk to an attorney. I 
have no idea," I think are similar. I think that, using the reasoning of that 
case, which of course is not binding, but the reasoning is persuasive. The 
request by Mr. Coulston here was not an unambiguous, unequivocal 
request for an attorney. It was ambiguous. 
Accordingly the motion to suppress is denied. 
(Tr., p.31, L.19 - p.33, L.6. (emphasis added).) 
On appeal, Coulston initially correctly recites the comment he made during his 
police interview that allegedly invoked his right to counsel as, "better talk to an attorney. 
I have no idea." (Appellant's Brief, p.9 (emphasis added).) However, when he makes 
his actual argument, Coulston neither mentions nor addresses the comment, "I have no 
. idea." (See Appellant's Brief, pp.10-11 ). Coulston states: 
7 Although mentioned by the district court, there was no issue below, nor is there on 
appeal, as to whether Coulston's question at the end of his police interview (i.e., does 
he "still get to speak to an attorney?") invoked his right to counsel. 
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When Officer Oyler pressed further, saying, "So this is where we're at with 
it," Mr. Coulston responded with, "No, I'm not[,] [n]o." Mr. Coulston then 
stated, "Guess from here on out, cause I know you guys got your things; 
better talk to an attorney." There is nothing unequivocal [sic] about Mr. 
Coulston's request, he stated, based upon the accusations ("I know you 
guys got your things") he had "better talk to an attorney." Any other 
conclusion ignores the totality of the interrogation, Mr. Coulston's body 
language, and the circumstances at the time he made his unequivocal 
request. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.10 (emphasis added).) By failing to even mention his "I have no 
idea" comment in his actual argument, Coulston fails to address the essential facts 
underlying the district court's decision, and instead analyzed a set of facts that does not 
exist. In short, it is Coulston, not the district court, who "ignores the totality of the 
interrogation." (See Id.) 
The failure to address that phrase is significant, as the district court clearly based 
its decision upon the entirety of Coulston's comment -- "better talk to an attorney. I 
have no idea." (Tr., p.31, Ls.19-23, p.32, Ls.20-25.) On its face, Coulston's comment, 
"I have no idea," makes his preceding comment of "better talk to an attorney" 
completely equivocal. An objective listener to Coulston's comment could reasonably 
conclude that, even if Coulston was thinking about talking to an attorney, he had "no 
idea" whether he wanted to do so. A person would be hard-pressed to find a clearer 
expression of uncertainty and equivocation than "I have no idea." (See http: 
//www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/equivocal ("having two or more possible 
meanings.") 
In an effort to lend credence to his position, Coulston argues "it is apparent" 
Detective Oyler recognized Coulston's request for counsel, by ignoring the request and 
(in part) pressing "even harder for an incriminatory statement" -- in contrast to the 
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detective's response to Coulston's question about an attorney at the end of the 
interview, when the detective acknowledged the request. (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-11.) 
However, because Coulston's statement of "better talk to an attorney" was immediately 
followed by "I have no idea," a reasonable police officer in those circumstances would 
not have understood his statement to be an unequivocal request for an attorney. 
Therefore, Coulston's statement did not require Detective Oyler to stop his questioning 
of Coulston. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. 
Coulston has failed to establish that the district court's factual findings were 
clearly erroneous or that the district court's decision to deny Coulston's motion to 
suppress was inconsistent with applicable constitutional principles. 
D. If There Was Error, It Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
Even if this Court concludes that Detective Oyler failed to scrupulously honor an 
unequivocal invocation by Coulston of his right to counsel, this Court should find that 
any error in the district court's ruling was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
Chapman v. California, 368 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 8 In so doing, this Court should consider 
that "[s]tatements obtained by police in violation of an accused's right to counsel may 
not be used in the State's case-in-chief, but are admissible to impeach the accused if he 
testifies at trial." State v. Cherry, 139 Idaho 579, 581, 83 P.3d 123, 125 (Ct. App. 2004) 
(citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971), and Michigan v Harvey, 494 U.S. 
344, 350-351 (1990)). 
8 Under Chapman v. California, 368 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), an appellate court may find 
some constitutional errors harmless where the court can hold beyond a reasonable 
doubt that it was harmless. 
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Coulston testified at trial that his admissions to Detective Oyler during the 
videotaped interview were truthful "[o]n one point" -- that he "woke up and found [AM.] 
on top of [him]." (Tr., p.827, Ls.9-14.) As to his other admissions, Coulston testified 
that he was just agreeing with what the detective said. (Tr., p.827, Ls.15-17.) Even if 
this Court concludes Coulston unequivocally invoked his right to counsel, the 
admissions Coulston subsequently made during that interview would have been 
admissible for the purpose of impeaching Coulston's testimony that he did not have 
sexual intercourse with AM., and he had never used the term "love-ins" with A.M. to 
indicate he wanted sex. (See Tr., p.809, Ls.15-25; p.817, L.25 - p.818, L.11; p.823, 
Ls.12-14; p.872, L.22 - p.876, L.14; p.879, Ls.12-13; St. Ex. 6, 49:25-50:05.) 
The "Statement of Facts," supra, outlines the testimony and evidence presented 
at trial showing Coulston's guilt. Even if the videotape of Coulston's interview with 
Detective Oyler is removed from consideration as substantive ( or even impeachment) 
evidence, there remains overwhelming evidence to support Coulston's conviction. The 
state relies on those facts to show that any error in admitting Coulston's videotaped 
interview by Detective Oyler into evidence was harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
The state asks this court to affirm Coulston's judgment of conviction for lewd and 
lascivious conduct. 
DATED this 16th day of March, 2015. 
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